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Abstract
The security of the .NET programming model is studied from the standpoint of fully abstract compilation of C. A number of
failures of full abstraction are identiﬁed, and ﬁxes described. The most serious problems have recently been ﬁxed for version 2.0 of
the .NET Common Language Runtime.
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1. Introduction
Type safety is a crucial aspect of security on Microsoft’s .NET platform just as it is on the Java Virtual Machine
(JVM). Enforcement of type system rules by the .NET Common Language Runtime (CLR) and JVM rules out a
number of dynamic errors, such as using an integer in place of an object reference, or invoking a method with the
wrong number of arguments. The .NET platform also uses types to securely isolate application domains (‘software
processes’), ensuring that information cannot leak accidentally between domains that are implemented by a single
shared heap.
Typically, a type loophole (in design or implementation) opens up the possibility of a malicious program executing
arbitrary code. But the security of a program can rely on more subtle properties, some of which can arguably be
considered type safety aspects (access control for ﬁelds and methods, sealing of classes, etc.) but others which go
beyond it.
Abadi noted the relevance of full abstraction to the security of a programming model [1]. A translation is fully
abstract if it preserves and reﬂects observational equivalence. So if source-language compilation is not fully abstract,
then there exist contexts (think ‘attackers’) in the target language that can observably distinguish two program fragments
not distinguishable by source contexts. Such abstraction holes can sometimes be turned into security holes: if the author
of a library has reasoned about the behaviour of his code by considering only source-level contexts (i.e. other components
written in the same source language), then it may be possible to construct a component in the target language which
provokes unexpected and damaging behaviour.
Abadi identiﬁed one such failure of full abstraction in the translation from Java to JVM bytecodes. The ‘Industrial
Application’ studied in this short paper is the investigation of full abstraction properties of the compilation from C[4,5]
to the Intermediate Language (IL) executed by the .NET CLR [6,7].
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2. The bad news
We ﬁrst present some bad news: six C coding patterns, made insecure by the failure of full abstraction. For each
pattern we present an equivalence that holds in C but whose compilation to IL breaks the equivalence, for the 2002
speciﬁcation of IL [6]. All ﬂaws were identiﬁed by the author; some were independently discovered by product teams
at Microsoft.
2.1. Problem 1: overridden methods are exposed
In C and other object-oriented programming languages, method overriding can be used to wrap methods from
existing classes with additional functionality, safe in the knowledge that client code cannot access the overridden
method. A typical use is to add parameter validation:
class InsecureWidget {
// No checking of argument
public virtual bool Put(string s) {...}
}
class SecureWidget : InsecureWidget {
// Check argument before delegating to superclass
public override bool Put(string s)
{ return Valid(s) ? base.Put(s) : false; }
}
From IL, but not from C, overridden methods can be called directly, subverting the abstraction:
.locals (class SecureWidget sw)
ldloc sw ldstr "Invalid string"
call void InsecureWidget::Put(string) // direct call
To demonstrate that this feature does indeed break full abstraction, we must exhibit two observationally equivalent
source language expressions and a context that distinguishes their translations. We could ﬂesh out this example by
making the validity check observable. Instead, consider the following, simpler example of method override:
public class Counter {
protected uint count = 0;
public void Inc() { count++; }
public virtual uint Get() { return count; }
}
public class ParityCounter : Counter {
public override uint Get() { return count%2; }
}
Here we have deﬁned a simple counter class whose internal state is hidden from clients, but accessible from the subclass
ParityCounter, which reﬁnes the class to expose only the parity of the counter. The following equivalence holds
in C:
void Bump(ParityCounter p) { p.Inc(); p.Inc(); }
≈ void Bump(ParityCounter p) { }
At the level of IL, these methods can be distinguished by making a direct call on p to the overridden method
Counter.Get, thus demonstrating that the translation from C to IL is not fully abstract.
2.2. Problem 2: boxing breaks encapsulation
Encapsulation is a fundamental concept in object-oriented programming. It ‘ensures that users of an object cannot
change the internal state of the object in unexpected ways’ (Wikipedia). A number of standard .NET types encapsulate
their state immutably; String is an example that is heap-allocated, and DateTime and Int32 are so-called value
types that also prohibit mutation. Values with such types can be boxed to obtain a heap-allocated version; as far as C
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is concerned, the boxed value behaves in the same way as the unboxed one, so properties such as immutability are
preserved. Here is some code that makes use of boxing:
// A dictionary keyed on strings
class StringDict {
private Hashtable dict;
public object Get(string s) { return dict[s]; }
internal void Set(string s, object o) { ... }
}
class HR {
public static StringDict salaries;
...salaries.Set("akenn", (object) ...)
}
// In another component, far away...
int mysalary = (int) HR.salaries.Get("akenn");
The Setmethod is internal and so cannot be invoked by client components; so it would seem that salaries can
be updated only from within this component. Unfortunately, the unbox instruction in IL, used to compile the (int)
cast above, produces an ‘interior’ pointer to an object that can be used to replace the boxed value in place. And so
boxed data, such as the salary record above, can be mutated unexpectedly:
ldsfld StringDict HR::salaries ldstr "akenn"
call object StringDict::Get(string)
unbox System.Int32 // Obtain interior pointer
ldc.i4 10000000 // That’ll do nicely
stind.i4 // Replace my salary
Failure of full abstraction can be demonstrated by the following equivalence which is broken by compilation
to IL:
public int g(object o) { int i = (int) o; f(o); return i; }
≈ public int g(object o) { int i = (int) o; f(o); return (int) o; }
2.3. Problem 3: exceptions are not Exceptions
In the C language, only objects whose type derives from System.Exception can be thrown as exceptions.
Programmers sometimes use this assumption in a transaction-like coding pattern, where recovery code is placed in a
catch-all block:
try {
// perform some action, to completion
} catch (Exception e) {
// undo action if an exception was thrown
}
// Action either completed, or was fully undone
Unfortunately, the catch-all does not catch all, as IL permits objects of any class to be thrown:
newobj instance void System.Object::.ctor()
throw
Suppose that the action in the try-block involved a call to code over which an attacker had control; then this code could
raise an exception such as above, and possibly leave the program in a bad state.
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To see that full abstraction is broken, consider the following C statements, which are indistinguishable from C but
can be distinguished at the level of IL by deﬁning an appropriate object-throwing method f:
int i=0; try { f(); i++; } catch(Exception e) { i++; }
≈ int i=1; try { f(); } catch(Exception e) { }
2.4. Problem 4: bools are not two-valued
Values false and true have type bool in C —and no other value inhabits the type. So it is reasonable for a
programmer to suppose that the WriteLine statement in this method can never be executed:
public void NotNot(bool b) {
bool c = !b;
if (!c != b) { Console.WriteLine("This cannot happen"); }
}
Unfortunately, in the type system of the runtime, bool and byte are interchangeable, with no conversions applied.
So Foo can be tricked by passing it a value not equal to 0 or 1 (the representations for false and true):
ldc.i4 2 call void NotNot(bool)
Thus the following equivalence is not preserved by compilation:
2.5. Problem 5: this can be null
In C the keyword this refers to the object on which a method was invoked. If a method is invoked on a null value
then NullReferenceException is thrown. So a programmer would reasonably expect that this can never be
null. Consider the method Act below, which executes some privileged action only if the object has previously been
registered through a public method.
class Widget {
// Instance registered for privileged action, private to class
private static Widget registered = null;
// Only register object if it passes authentication
public void Register() {
if (Authenticate()) { registered = this; }
}
public void Act() {
if (this == registered) {




Unfortunately, it is possible from IL to trick the method Act into executing the privileged action prior to registration
by passing it a null instance:
ldnull
call void Widget::Act()
It is clear that the following contextual equivalence, valid in C, is not preserved by compilation to IL:
public bool m() { return this==null; }
≈ public bool m() { return false; }
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2.6. Problem 6: out parameters are also in
In contrast to Java, C supports call-by-reference as well as call-by-value. A special form of call-by-reference, so-
called out parameters, must be assigned by the callee before returning. Moreover, according to the C speciﬁcation
[5, Section 17.5.1.3], ‘an output parameter is initially considered unassigned and must be deﬁnitely assigned before
its value is used’. Typically, out parameters are used to return multiple values from a method, as in the following
example:
// Reader interface, int denotes number of repeats of a string
interface IReader { int Get(out string result); }
class C {
public static void TestGet(IReader reader)
{
string s = GetSecret();
...




Here, a programmer has used variables for two distinct purposes inmethodTestGet, ﬁrst assigning it some privileged
information, and subsequently using it to return data from a call to Get. This is sloppy programming—but given the
C speciﬁcation, it should not be insecure.
Unfortunately, the typing rules for IL do not distinguishout parameters from ordinary call-by-reference. An attacker
can pass an instance of IReader to TestGet that breaks the out-parameter invariant and so leak the privileged
information:
.class public Attacker implements IReader {
.field public static string Leak
.method public virtual int Get([out] string& s) cil managed {
ldarg s
ldind.ref
// We’ve got hold of s, let’s keep it somewhere
stsfld string Attacker::Leak





The following simple equivalence is not preserved by compilation:
{ int i = 5; x.m(out i); }
≈ { int i = 7; x.m(out i); }
3. The good news
Fortunately, it is possible to ﬁx failures of full abstraction such as these, in one of three ways.
• We can change the translation, i.e. the compilation scheme. But it’s often the case that the non-fully-abstract
translation was direct and efﬁcient; anything less direct is likely to cost more. For example, Problem 4 can be ﬁxed
by generating code to ‘normalize’ integers typed as bool at appropriate points in the code (see below).
• We can increase the expressivity of the source language (C) to add back contexts corresponding to those in IL,
thereby identifying fewer terms. For example, we could solve Problem 3 by supporting the throwing of arbitrary
objects; or we could solve Problem 1 by supporting direct calls in C on overridden methods. Although technically
this is a solution to the ‘full abstraction problem’, it weakens our ability to create abstractions in the source
language.
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• We can reduce the expressivity of the target language (IL) to rule out problematic contexts, and therefore identify
more terms. This is the ideal ﬁx; but it is a ‘breaking’ change to the speciﬁcation of the target. This is particularly
awkward when multiple source languages are supported, as is the case in the .NET CLR.
Problems 1–3 identiﬁed above have been ﬁxed in version 2.0 of the .NET CLR by changing the speciﬁcation of IL
[7], and implementing these changes in the veriﬁer (type-checker) and runtime system.
Problem 1. At veriﬁcation time we simply reject direct calls to non-ﬁnal virtual methods, except when invoking an
overridden method from the overriding method (a so-called base call).
Problem 2. The mutable boxed value type problem is solved by changing the typing rule for the unbox instruction to
return a special kind of interior pointer—called a ‘controlled mutability’ pointer in the revised IL speciﬁcation [7]—that
prohibits update-in-place.
Problem 3. We wrap all non-Exception-deriving exceptions inside objects of type RuntimeWrapper
Exception, and unwrap the exception when caught by a language (such as Managed C++) that supports arbitrary
exception objects.
That leaves three (known) problems.
Problem 4. It turns out that most logical operations on bools interpret zero as false and non-zero as true, and hence
are not affected by the possibility of values other than 0 or 1. Two exceptions are == and !=, which perform a simple
bitwise comparison on bytes. So it would appear at ﬁrst that we can simply ﬁx the C compiler by generating code for
equality on booleans that interprets any non-zero value as true. Unfortunately, that is not enough, as it may be the
context which performs the equality test. The following equivalence is not preserved:
bool b = f(); g(b);
≈ bool b = f(); g(b ? true : false);
Consider a distinguishing IL context in which the function f returns the value 2 and the function g tests for ‘boolean’
equality between its argument and the value 2. A better ﬁx is therefore to change the behaviour of equality on booleans
at the IL level.
Problem 5. The null instance problem is mitigated somewhat by the ﬁx for Problem 1, as virtual calls must check
for null already, and so with this in place only non-virtual instance methods can now be invoked on null instances. One
solution is to alter the translation ofC to IL, by inserting a null-check in a prologue to every non-virtual instancemethod,
throwing NullReferenceException if the check fails. Alternatively, the IL speciﬁcation could be changed so
that the semantics of the call instruction on instance methods is to throw an exception when passed a null instance.
Problem 6. The ideal ﬁx for this problem is simply to replicate the C rules at the level of IL, verifying that out
parameters are not accessed until they have been assigned a value.
It is the opinion of the author that these last three problems are not as serious—indeed it is hard to contrive even
artiﬁcial security exploits. Nevertheless, in the absence of ﬁxes, we should educate programmers, warning them that
bool can hide a byte, that this may be null, and that variables passed as out parameters can be inspected by the
callee.
4. Discussion
One could argue that full abstraction is just a nicety; programmers do not really reason about observations, program
contexts, and all that, do they? Well, actually, I would like to argue that they do. At least, expert programmers, the sort
that produce design patterns, coding guidelines, and the like, do think this way—how else would patterns of the kind
discussed in Section 2 be proposed?
Nonetheless, (aiming for) full abstraction is just a start. Languages inevitably contain weaknesses, C included, and
these weaknesses lead to security holes. For example, the mutability of arrays is a common cause of security bugs in
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libraries for both Java andC. (Typically, a programmermarks an array-type ﬁeld or propertyreadonly but forgets that
the elements of the array can be mutated.) The ability to apply checked downcasts can lead to holes too; one naïve ‘solu-
tion’ to the mutability of arrays is to pass the array at a supertype that prevents mutation (System.IEnumerable);
this fails because the array type can be recovered through downcasting. As the semantics community knows, the right
way to think about such issues is by studying observational equivalence.
The complexities of industrial programming languages and platforms can make questions such as full abstraction
and even type safety hard to pin down. For example, .NET, like Java, has a reﬂection capability that destroys any
sensible notion of contextual equivalence: programs can reﬂect on the number of methods in their implementation,
or inspect the current call-stack. To be of any use at all, a deﬁnition of contextual equivalence has to ignore these
capabilities (which, incidentally, are not available to untrusted components, i.e. the sort that we have been considering
as potential ‘attacker’ contexts). Furthermore, the .NET platform does not require veriﬁcation of trusted components
such as system libraries—but such components must still preserve the invariants for which veriﬁcation is a sound,
conservative decision procedure.
What next? Well, of course we have no proofs of full abstraction, nor even proofs of contextual equivalences that
hold in C. Neither do we have proofs of type safety for all of C or IL, though recently large subsets of both C and
IL have been formalized [2,3] and proved type-safe, and we understand type safety well enough to be conﬁdent that
these results scale to the full language.
Given this, a more pessimistic approach is to assume that full abstraction holes abound; then, make absolutely certain
that particular coding patterns are secure. Or, we might consider full abstraction at restricted types—surely we can be
conﬁdent of the security of methods of type int → int?
In summary, the aim of this work is to ensure that C programmers can reason about the security of their code by
thinking in C. More precisely:
A C programmer can reason about the security properties of component A by considering the behaviour of
another component B written in C that ‘attacks’ A through its public API.
This can only be achieved if compilation is fully abstract.
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